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In “Perceptual Variation and Ignorance” (forthcoming) I claim:
perceptual defeasibility
If your evidence assigns a low probability to your perception that p
being accurate, you cannot justifiably believe that p based on your
perception.
I also claim that, once you learn about perceptual variation, your evidence
assigns a low probability to your perception being accurate. Both claims
should be uncontroversial. If they sound controversial, it’s because they
sound like claims that have been rejected by Pryor (2000), Wright (2002),
Goldman (2008), Williamson (2014), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Kelly (2010)
and Wedgwood (2007). Let’s distinguish them.
Pryor (2000) (a “liberal”), Wright (2002) (a “conservative”), and Gold-
man (2008) (a “reliabilist”) all deny that you must have evidence for the
accuracy of your perception in order to justifiably believe that p based on it.
For example, according to them, you can justifiably believe that you have
two hands even if you lack evidence that you’re not hallucinating hands. In-
deed, on Pryor’s view, your perception can itself justify the belief that you’re
not hallucinating hands. But these philosophers also say that, once you get
evidence assigning a low probability to your perception being accurate, you
can no longer justifiably believe that you have two hands. If you learn that
you’ve ingested hallucinogens, your perception alone can’t justify the belief
that you have two hands.
Williamson (2014) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) describe examples in which
your evidence assigns a high probability to your belief that p being accu-
rate, and a low probability to your belief that p being justified. But they
aren’t counterexamples to perceptual defeasibility. To appreciate why,
consider Williamson’s famous clock example (p.979–980).1 Suppose you’re
1While the original example is about knowledge, he later says that it works just as well
for justified belief (p.981–982).
looking at the second hand on an unmarked clock, and that the most exact
proposition you can justifiably believe is that the second hand is between
8 and 12. Because your belief is justified, your evidence must assign a high
probability to the second hand being in that range. As a result, your evidence
must assign a high probability to your belief being accurate. Nonetheless,
Williamson argues, your evidence assigns a low probability to your belief
being justified. According to Williamson, your belief is justified only if the
second hand is at 10. If the second hand were at 11, the most exact propo-
sition you could justifiably believe is that the second hand is between 9 and
13. More generally, if the second hand is at x, the most exact proposition
you can justifiably believe is that the second hand is between x−2 and x+2.
Because your evidence merely assigns a high probability to second hand be-
ing somewhere between 8 and 10, it assigns a low probability to it being at
10. Williamson infers that your evidence assigns a low probability to your
belief being justified. Your evidence assigns a high probability to your belief
being accurate and a low probability to its being justified.
This isn’t a counterexample to perceptual defeasibility, because
perceptual defeasibility applies when your evidence assigns a low prob-
ability to your perception being accurate, not when your evidence assigns a
low probability to your belief being justified. The antecedent of perceptual
defeasibility is about a different kind of mental state (perception, not be-
lief) and a different kind of assessment (accuracy, not justification). It might
help to note that, in Williamson’s counterexample, you presumably believe
that the second hand is between 8 and 12 because that’s what you perceive.
In that case, your evidence assigns a high probability to your perception be-
ing accurate. To be a counterexample to perceptual defeasibility, your
evidence would need to assign a low probability to your perception being
accurate.
perceptual defeasibility should thus be uncontroversial. Let’s now
consider its application to perceptual variation. I claim that, once you learn
about perceptual variation, your evidence assigns a low probability to your
perception being accurate. Kelly (2010) and Wedgwood (2007) might seem
least likely to agree (as “anti-conciliationists”), so let’s consider their views.
Kelly (2010) claims that if you justifiably believe that p, and discover a
disagreement about p with epistemic peers who have the same evidence, you
can still justifiably believe that p. For example, if you justifiably believe that
it will rain tomorrow on the basis of the meteorological data, you can still
justifiably believe that it will rain, even if an epistemic peer believes that it
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won’t based on the same data. Kelly says that this is because the evidence
for your belief includes more than just the psychological facts about what you
believe and what your epistemic peer believes. Your evidence also includes
the meteorological data itself, and that might still be enough to justify your
belief. Thus, even when you discover the disagreement, your evidence still
assigns a high probability to your belief being accurate (p.132–134). But
when your disagreement is based entirely on different perceptions, there is no
other evidence. Your evidence is exhausted by the psychological facts about
what you perceive, what the other person perceives, and your reliability
in uncontroversial cases. There is nothing analogous to the meteorological
data, no further evidence that grounds your belief that the lemon is pure
yellow rather than greenish yellow. Thus, according to Kelly, when you
learn that someone else perceives things differently, your evidence assigns a
low probability to your perception being accurate, and you should suspend
judgment (p.150–152).
Wedgwood (2007, p.257–266) claims that if you have a normative intu-
ition that p, and discover that others have different intuitions, you can still
justifiably believe that p. For example, if you have the normative intuition
that eating meat is ethically permissible, and discover that another person
has the intuition that it’s impermissible, you can still justifiably believe that
it is permissible. Even so, Wedgwood insists that your justification can be
defeated, either by incoherence with the rest of your beliefs, or by evidence
that the other person’s normative intuitions are at least as reliable (p.244,
258). With respect to your normative intuitions, this second kind of evidence
is rare. Wedgwood’s only example is when the other person has previously
brought about significant changes in your own normative intuitions (p.263).
In most cases, you don’t have any evidence about the reliability of your own
normative intuitions or the other person’s normative intuitions, and thus
your evidence doesn’t assign any probability to the accuracy of your intu-
ition. When that happens, Wedgwood thinks that you’re justified in relying
more on your own intuition. Thus, your intuition can still justify your be-
lief. Wedgwood doesn’t say as much about perceptions, but he does say
the justification for beliefs based on perception can be defeated in the same
ways: either by incoherence with the rest of your beliefs, or by evidence that
the other person’s perceptions are at least as reliable (p.259, 262). Unlike
normative intuitions, this second kind of evidence is plentiful. You can, for
example, confirm that others perform equally well on standard perceptual
tasks, such as the Farnsworth-Munsell Hue Test. You also know that percep-
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tions of fine-grained colors are the result of haphazard genetic mutations and
environmental interactions, much like your exact height, skin pigment, and
hair density. Thus, with respect to perception, the situation is quite differ-
ent; you have a lot of evidence about the reliability of your own perceptions
and other people’s perceptions, and that evidence assigns a low probability
to your own perception being accurate.
For these reasons, it should be uncontroversial that Perceptual De-
feasibility is true and applies to perceptual variation.2
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